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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20020892-CA 
v. : 
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ, : 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that defendant 
is not entitled to a conviction for misdemeanor identity fraud instead of felony forgery where 
the forgery and identity fraud statutes do not proscribe the same conduct, and defendant's use 
of a writing to accomplish his fraud justifies his forgery conviction. 
"'Our review under the Shondel rule focuses on the trial court's legal conclusions, 
which we review under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to 
the trial court's ruling.'" State v. Green, 995 P.2d 1250 (Utah App. 2000) (quoting State v. 
Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah App.1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to the issue raised on appeal and are attached at 
Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6 501 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 6,2002, defendant Anthony James Valdez was charged by information 
with forgery, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(R. 2). A jury 
trial was held, during which defendant sought a directed verdict out of the presence of the 
jury after the State rested its case (R. 64: 92-94).x He based his motion on an alleged lack 
of evidence and on his evaluation that the case "more properly should have been charged as 
identity fraud" (R. 64:96). In arguing his motion to the court, defense counsel noted that the 
two statutes are "almost identical" and identified for the court at least two differences 
between the statutes (R. 64: 94-96). The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict, 
explaining that it was the utterance of a writing in this case that justified the forgery charge 
(R. 64: 96). The court then stated: 
!In the same argument to the trial court, defense counsel also asked "that the count 
be amended to a count of identity fraud, a Class B misdemeanor" (R. 64: 96). The court 
ruled solely on the request for a directed verdict (id.). Add. B. 
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So you may try and use it [identity fraud] as a lesser included, but I 
think that there's surely sufficient enough evidence to show that the more 
serious crime of forgery was committed. 
(R. 64: 96). The trial court permitted the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction on 
identity fraud, and continued the trial (R. 94:96) (oral ruling attached in Addendum B). The 
jury convicted defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate 
term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years (R. 48; R. 64:139). Defendant filed 
a timely notice of appeal (R. 50). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Close to noon on October 29,2001, Amber Hamlin took her 1988 Chevrolet Baretta 
to Master Muffler and Brake in Keams, UT (R. 64: 21). The vehicle needed repairs on the 
exhaust system and replacement of the catalytic converter (R. 64: 23). Jeremy Jeffs was the 
mechanic on duty that day (R. 64:21). Jeffs knew Ms. Hamlin from Junior High school and 
had seen her "off and on" since then (R. 64:22). 
Defendant accompanied Ms. Hamlin when she dropped off the car (R. 64:25). Ms. 
Hamlin came into the shop to talk to Jeffs while defendant remained outside of the shop area 
(R. 64:25). Jeffs saw Ms. Hamlin and defendant walking together as they left (R. 64:25,28). 
Jeffs later identified defendant in court (R. 64:24). 
Defendant, Ms. Hamlin, and another man returned around 5:30 that evening to pick 
up the car (R. 64:35, 36). Ms. Hamlin came into the shop area again and talked with Jeffs 
2The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah App. 1995). 
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as he was lying underneath a vehicle (R. 64:26). Jeffs' supervisor, Dennis Hogge, was 
working in the office area/waiting room when defendant came in and said he was there to 
pick up Ms. Hamlin's car and pay the repair bill (R. 64:30, 34). Defendant explained that 
he was paying the bill because he owed Ms. Hamlin some money (R. 64:36). The repair bill 
came to $278.71 (R. 64:34). Defendant presented Hogge with a completed check that had 
been filled out beforehand (R. 64:36). The check belonged to, and had the signature of, James 
Batley (R. 64:34; State's Ex . #1). When Hogge received the check he wrote down the 
driver's license number and driver's license expiration date from the driver's license that 
defendant showed him for identification purposes (R. 64:38). He did not, however, look at 
either the name or the picture on the license (id.). Police later found that the license number 
belonged to Tammy Searcy, who is not involved in this litigation (R. 64:38, State's Ex. #4). 
Defendant also signed the catalytic converter form that is required by the EPA 
whenever a catalytic converter is replaced (R. 64:39). The shop keeps a copy of this form 
on file, and sends a copy to the Environmental Protection Agency (R. 64:40). Hogge filled 
out all of this catalytic converter form except for the signature, and then defendant signed it 
with a name purporting to be "James Batley" (R. 64:40,42-43, State's Exh. 2). The second 
man accompanying defendant played no role in the transaction (R. 64:35). Hogge testified 
that the same person who gave him the check signed the converter form (R. 64:43). Hogge 
identified defendant in court but did not recognize Tammy Searcy when shown a picture of 
her (R. 64:35,43). 
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About ten days later the check was returned from the collection agency to the shop 
marked, "LOST/STOLEN." (R. 64:41, State's Ex. #1). The face of the check bore the name 
"James Batley" and an address (R. 64:57). Bob Elder, assistant manager of the muffler store, 
called Mr. Batley, who told him that the check was one of several that had been stolen from 
Batley's car earlier that same month (R. 64:32,42, 55-56). Mr. Batley had not signed any 
of the checks before they were stolen and had not given anyone permission to sign his name 
on them (R. 64:59). Mr. Batley did not know either Amber or defendant (R. 64: 59). 
Detective Dalton Campbell took the returned check and converter form into custody 
for his investigation (R. 64:65). He had the check and the converter form processed at the 
crime lab (R. 64: 68). No positive identification was obtained from the check (R. 64:85). 
However, Mr. Fassett did find 12 or 13 points of comparison on a print lifted from the 
converter form and testified that it matched defendant's left ring finger (R. 64:90). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim that the forgery and identity fraud statutes proscribe the same 
conduct, requiring that he be convicted of identify fraud under Shondel because it carries the 
lesser penalty, is without merit. Shondel requires that the statutes proscribe exactly the same 
conduct, i.e., contain the same elements. There is no Shondel issue here because the 
elements of the two statutes are not identical. Forgery cannot be completed absent the use 
of a writing, and identity fraud has no such requirement. Identity fraud requires that the 
person whose identifying information is taken be a real person, but forgery has no such 
requirement. Further, identity fraud requires proof of the value of the item or services 
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wrongfully obtained, while forgery has no such requirement. The conduct violating each 
statute may very well be similar. However, forgery is a particular type of fraudulent use of 
information which the legislature reasonably has chosen to punish more severely than the 
general use of another's fraudulent information, as would be punished under the identity 
fraud statute. 
Because the statutes are distinguishable, Shondel is not applicable, and defendant's 
claim of error fails. 
ARGUMENT 
THE IDENTITY FRAUD AND FORGERY STATUTES DO NOT 
PROSCRIBE THE SAME CONDUCT, AND DEFENDANT'S USE OF 
A WRITING TO ACCOMPLISH HIS FRAUD JUSTIFIED HIS 
CONVICTION UNDER THE STATUTE CARRYING THE MORE 
SEVERE SENTENCE 
Defendant seeks re-sentencing. Br. of Aplt. at 7,22. He presents a Shondel argument, 
claiming that because his criminal conduct subjects him to punishment under two separate 
criminal statutes, and, because the elements of those offenses are "indistinguishable" or 
"nearly identical[,]" he is entitled to be convicted of the offense which carries the more 
lenient sentence.3 Id. at 6-22. Specifically, he argues that the identity fraud statute and the 
forgery statute both cover his presentation of a forged check and endorsement of a forged 
signature, but that he should have been convicted of identity fraud instead of forgery because 
identity fraud carries the more lenient sentence: a class B misdemeanor, as opposed to the 
Pursuant to State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969). 
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third degree felony imposed pursuant to his forgery conviction. Id, However, defendant's 
claim fails because the statutes are readily distinguishable. 
Under Shondel, "if one or both of the crimes at issue 'require[] proof of some fact or 
element not required to establish the other,' the statutes do not criminalize identical conduct 
and the State can charge an individual with the crime carrying the higher classification or 
more severe sentence." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f 47,52 P.3d 1194 (quoting State 
v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah 1981)), cert, denied, U.S. , 123 S. Ct. 859 (Jan. 
13,2003); see also State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4,f 21, 57 P.3d 977 (stating that when elements 
of crimes differ, no equal protection violation under Shondel lies), cert, denied, U.S. , 
123 S. Ct. 257 (Oct. 7, 2002); State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that 
Shondel applies only when the two statutes are "wholly duplicative" as to the crime's 
elements). The Shondel doctrine ensures that the criminal laws are written so that "there are 
significant differences between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not subject to 
different penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to 
charge." Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, at % 48 (citing Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263). Shondel requires 
"that a prosecutor who elects to charge an individual with a crime carrying a higher penalty 
or classification do so knowing that the prosecutor will be required to prove at least one 
additional or different element to obtain a conviction for the higher-penalty crime." 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, at f 48. 
To evaluate defendant's claim, this Court must determine whether the two statutes 
proscribe exactly the same conduct and whether the elements of each crime are "wholly 
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duplicative." Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263; see also State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 
1986). 
The relevant part of the forgery statute provides 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or 
utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or 
the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent..." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). Add. A. 
The identity fraud statute provides: 
(2) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(a) obtains personal identifying information of another 
person without the authorization of that person; and 
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with 
fraudulent intent, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, 
credit, goods, services, any other thing of value, or medical 
information in the name of another person without the consent 
of that person. 
(3) Identity fraud is: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the credit, 
goods, services, or any other thing of value is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor if: 
(i) a value cannot be determined and the 
personal identifying information has been used to 
obtain medical information in the name of another 
person without the consent of that person; or 
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(ii) the value of the credit, goods, services, 
or any other thing of value is or exceeds $300 but 
is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, 
services, or any other thing of value is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; or 
(d) a second degree felony if the value of the credit, 
goods, services, or any other thing of value is or exceeds $5,000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2) & (3) (Supp. 2001). Add. A. 
A comparison of these statutes shows several differences: 
1. Forgery requires use of a writing; identity fraud does not. 
2. Identity fraud requires that the personal identifying information belong to a live 
person; forgery is committed whether the writing purports to be the act of a live, dead, 
or a fictitious person. 
3. Identity fraud requires proof of the value of the credit, goods, services, or other 
thing of value illegally obtained or sought to be obtained; forgery requires no such 
proof. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501 with 76-6-1102. That these differences are sufficient 
to distinguish the offenses and permit defendant's conviction for forgery is clear under Utah 
case law. 
This case is controlled by the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gomez, 722 
P.2d 747 (Utah 1986) (attached in Addendum C). In Gomez, defendants Steve and 
Jacqueline Gomez signed sales slips in the course of making purchases with someone else's 
improperly-obtained credit card. Id. at 748. Both were charged under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-506.1, involving wrongful use of a financial transaction card, a second degree felony. Id. 
Counsel for one defendant moved to reduce the charges either to a third degree felony under 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.2, which also punished unlawful use of financial transaction 
cards, on the grounds that the statutes proscribe the same conduct and, therefore, defendant 
had a right to be charged under the offense carrying the lesser penally. Id. The trial court 
agreed, suggested amendment of the information to charge a lesser offense, and, upon the 
State's refusal, dismissed the information as to that defendant. Id. at 748-49. The court 
dismissed the co-defendant's information for the same reason upon stipulation by the parties 
that she should be treated like her co-defendant. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed as to both defendants, finding that the statutes do 
not have identical elements. Id. at 749-50. The Court determined that section 76-6-506.1 
requires proof of a "signing" of a sales slip, while section 76-6-506.2 does not. Id. at 749. 
The Court also noted that section 76-6-506.2 requires proof of the value of the items 
fraudulently purchased, while section 76-6-506.1 does not. Id. In holding that the statutes 
did not proscribe the same conduct, the Supreme Court explained that the legislature had and 
exercised the power to determine "that the act of fraudulently 'signing a card or sales slip 
should be punished more severely than the mere fraudulent use of a financial transaction 
card." Id. at 749. While "the reason for the distinction between subsections -506.1 and -
506.2 in the financial transaction card offenses is rather hard to fathom, especially when most 
credit card sales probably involve a 'signing,'" the Court was unable to opine that it is 
"irrational or arbitrary." Id. at 750 (footnote omitted which identified examples of 
transactions not involving a "signing"). 
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Not only does the same rationale apply in this case, but the statutes reflect the same 
differences in the elements that appeared in Gomez. The forgery and identity fraud statutes 
both punish a defendant for fraudulently obtaining something by pretending to be someone 
else. However, the forgery statute, which carries the more severe sentence, requires the use 
of a writing, whereas the identity fraud statute does not. Further, the identity fraud statute 
requires proof of the value of the fraudulently-obtained gains, while the forgery statute does 
not. As in Gomez, these differences demonstrate that the legislature has seen fit to provide 
that where the fraud is accomplished by means of a writing, the conduct should be punished 
more severely than the mere fraudulent use, without a writing, of someone's personal 
identifying information. See Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749. Such a determination is within the 
power of the legislature. See id:, see also State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075, 
1078(1959). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized: 
It is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more severe penalty for 
a particular type of crime than the penalty which is imposed with respect to the 
general category of crimes to which the special crime is related or of which it 
is a subcategory . . . . As long as the legislative classifications are not 
arbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a general and a specific 
provision of the criminal laws does not render the legislation unconstitutional, 
even though one violation is subject to a greater sentence. 
See Clark, 632 P.2d at 843-44; see also Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749-50. 
Because the identity fraud statute prohibits using personal identifying information of 
another generally, and the forgery statute prohibits using such information in the form of a 
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writing specifically, the imposition of a greater penalty for use of a writing is neither 
arbitrary nor unconstitutional. See Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749-50. 
In this case, defendant was charged with, and convicted of, obtaining goods and 
services from the repair shop by means of uttering a check which had previously been stolen 
from James Batley and had been filled out by someone else without his authorization. He 
also signed Mr. Batley's name to the governmental form required for the type of repair that 
had been done. Because his fraudulent conduct was accomplished through means of written 
documents, he was properly "'charged with the crime carrying the more severe sentence. . 
. . '" Gomez, 722 P.2d at 750 (quoting Clark, 632 P.2d at 844) (additional citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
This case does not present a novel or important issue. Consequently, the State does 
not ask that the matter be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this q c d a y of March, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorn^ General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 8B 
1999 REPLACEMENT 
Titles 76 and 77 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing* defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecunian 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 32, § 19; 
1975, ch. 52, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 15; 1996, 
^u Qf\Z & 2 7 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
2001 Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B 
1999 EDITION 
Place in Pocket of Corresponding Bound Volume. 
76-6-1102. Identity fraud crime. 
(1) For purposes of this part, "personal identifying information" may in-
clude: 
(a) name; 
(b) address; 
(c) telephone number; 
(d) driver's license number; 
(e) Social Security number; 
(f) place of employment; 
(g) employee identification numbers or other personal identification 
numbers; 
(h) mother's maiden name; 
(i) electronic identification numbers; 
(j) digital signatures or a private key; or 
(k) any other numbers or information that can be used to access a 
person's financial resources or medical information in the name of another 
person without the consent of that person except for numbers or informa-
tion that can be prosecuted as financial transaction card offenses under 
Sections 76-6-506 through 76-6-506.4. 
(2) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(a) obtains personal identifying information of another person without 
the authorization of that person; and 
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with fraudulent intent, 
including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, any other 
thing of value, or medical information in the name of another person 
without the consent of that person. 
(3) Identity fraud is: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the credit, goods, services, or 
any other thing of value is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor if: 
(i) a value cannot be determined and the personal identifying 
information has been used to obtain medical information in the name 
of another person without the consent of that person; or 
(ii) the value of the credit, goods, services, or any other thing of 
value is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or any 
other thing of value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; or 
(d) a second degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or 
any other thing of value is or exceeds $5,000. 
(4) Multiple violations within a 90-day period may be aggregated into a 
single offense, and the degree of the offense is determined by the total value of 
all credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value used, or attempted to be 
used, through the multiple violations. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1102, enac ted by L. came effective on May 1 2000, pursuant to 
2000, ch. 57, * 5. Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 25 
Effective Dates . — Laws 2000, ch 57 be-
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1 significant, but I'm going to deny your motion. 
2 MR. O'CONNELL: Then, your Honor, at this point I'd be 
3 moving for a directed verdict. I think the first basis, it's 
4 just I don't think the evidence at this point is enough to send 
5 it to a jury. 
6 More importantly, the reason why -- this is also to 
7 explain why (inaudible) the lesser included instruction it 
8 has of identity fraud is that I actually think this is more 
9 correctly charged as identity fraud, and not forgery. 
10 Identity fraud, the previous statute, is less than 
11 — I think it's only a year old. It's something that the 
12 legislature passed recently. In identity fraud, a person who 
13 commits — guilty of identity fraud — this is from 706-1102 
14 Section 2 — "is guilty of identity fraud when a person 
15 knowingly and intentionally obtains personal identifying 
16 information of another person without the authorization of 
17 that person, and uses or attempts to use that information with 
18 fraudulent intent including to obtain or attempt to obtain 
19 goods, service, any other thing of value." Then it goes on, 
20 but that's the provision (inaudible). 
21 I think that's what we have in this case. We have 
22 an individual who has obtained identifying information. 
23 Identifying information, by the way, can be as simple as 
24 just a name. It could be an address, telephone numbers, 
25 driver's license number, Social Security number, employment 
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1 identification number or other personal identification number, 
2 which I would say is similar to having a checking account 
3 number. 
4 In this case we have somebody's name that's been taken 
5 without permission, and that was testified by Mr. Batley, and 
6 it was used. In this case it was used on a check to obtain 
7 services. It was also used to sign onto the certificate form, 
8 in that case to try to procure with fraudulent intent goods 
9 or services. In this case I think it was probably a little bit 
10 of both. I assume there were parts involved and services in 
11 this case. That's what happened in this case, and that's what 
12 identity fraud is. 
13 I actually think when they passed the identity fraud 
14 — I looked at the statute and compared it when I actually did 
15 an identity fraud trial, to the forgery statute, and they're 
16 almost identical. I think there are some differences in 
17 forgeries. Some type of forgeries, for example, can have a 
18 situation where you have a fictional person involved. For 
19 identity fraud you need a real person. In this case we have 
20 a real person, Mr. Batley. I would just argue we have — I 
21 forget her name, but the woman whose driver's license number 
22 was used as well. Both are real people. Both were involved. 
23 Also in forgery I don't think you necessarily need 
24 to get any property, while in identity fraud you need to get 
25 something of value, because identity fraud classification is 
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1 based on how much is taken in value. In this case we have 
2 something taken in value. We also have something that was — 
3 we also have a real person involved. 
4 So I think that this is more properly should have been 
5 charged as identity fraud, and Mr. Valdez is entitled to — if 
6 there is another charge that covers the same moment and covers 
7 the same conduct, and it is of a lesser charge — in this case 
8 it would be a Class A misdemeanor because the value is less 
9 than $300 — is entitled to be convicted only of that charge. 
10 So I would ask that the count be amended to a count of identity 
11 fraud, a Class B misdemeanor. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Well, your motion to dismiss on a 
13 directed verdict is denied. I think there's testimony that 
14 Mr. Valdez is the individual that wrote the check and received 
15 the goods and services, and I think the difference between 
16 identity fraud and forgery is the writing part of it. Identity 
17 fraud does not include the utterance of a writing, and in this 
18 particular incident we have the uttering of a writing. 
19 So you may try and use it as a lesser included, but I 
20 think that there's surely sufficient enough evidence to show 
21 that the more serious crime of forgery was committed. 
22 Mr. Dalesandro, do you want leave of the record for 
23 anything to supplement the — 
24 MR. DALESANDRO: Well, I think Mr. 0'Connell is ]ust 
25 mixing apples and oranges here. I think the standard for a 
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Supreme Court of Utah 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v 
Steve GOMEZ and Jacqueline Gomez, Defendants 
and Respondents 
No. 20520. 
May 6, 1986 
Rehearing Denied July 29, 1986 
The State appealed from an order of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Judith M Billings, J , 
dismissing an information charging defendants with 
wrongful use of a financial transaction card The 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J , held that (1) appeal 
from dismissal of information, which was dismissed on 
suggestion of State, was a proper appeal by State "from 
a final judgment of dismissal", (2) defendants could be 
charged under statute proscribing the wrongful use of 
a financial transaction card by "signing" a sales slip, 
which carried a more severe sentence than, and 
proscnbed different conduct than that proscribed in, 
statute prohibiting the mere fraudulent use of a financial 
transaction card, and (3) State properly charged 
defendants with wrongful use of a financial transaction 
card by "signing" a sales slip 
Reversed 
West Headnotes 
i l l Criminal Law €=>1024(2) 
110kl024(2) Most Cited Cases 
Appeal by State from dismissal of information on 
suggestion of State was a proper appeal by State "from 
a final judgment of dismissal," where trial court 
determined that charges were to be reduced to offense 
carrying lesser penalty not charged in original 
information and, thus, effectively prevented State from 
proceeding on the ongmal charges UCA1953, 
77-35-26(c)(l) 
12] False Pretenses €==>7(1) 
170k7(l) Most Cited Cases 
U C A 1953, 76-6-506 L proscribing the wrongful use 
of a financial transaction card by "signing" a sales slip, 
did not proscribe the same conduct as I C A 1953, 
76-6-506 2, proscribing the mere fraudulent use of a 
Copr e West 2003 No Claim 
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financial transaction card, without proof of "signing" of 
sale slip but with proof of value of items fraudulently 
purchased, so that defendants could be charged with 
violating UC A, 19S3 76-6-506 1, which was the 
offense which carried the more severe penalty 
121 False Pretenses €=>7(1) 
170k7(T) Most Cited Cases 
Distinction between L C A 1953,76-6-506 1, requiring 
proof of "signing" of sales slip in order to sustain 
conviction for wrongful use of financial transaction 
card, and UC A 1953, 76-6-^06 2, which did not 
require such proof to convict for mere fraudulent use of 
financial transaction card, was neither irrational nor 
arbitrary 
141 False Pretenses €=^7(1) 
170k7( 1) Most Cited Cases 
Defendants were properly charged with wrongful use of 
a financial transaction card by "signing" a sales slip, 
where defendants allegedly signed another person's 
name to sales slips during alleged purchases of goods 
with improperly obtained credit card UC A 1953 
76-6-506.1 
*748 David L Wilkinson, Arty Gen, J Stephen 
Mikita, Ted Cannon, Co Arty, Gregory L Bown, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant 
Nancy Bergeson, Khris Harrold, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice 
The State of Utah appeals from the trial court's order 
dismissing an information charging Steve and 
Jacqueline Gomez with wrongful use of a financial 
transaction card under section 76-6-506 1 of the Code 
The trial court found that sections 76-6-506 1 and 
76-6-506 2 proscribed identical conduct, that section 
76-6-506.2 earned a lesser penalty, and that the 
defendants were entitled to be charged with the lesser 
crime We conclude that the statutes do not proscribe 
the same conduct because they do not contain the same 
elements, therefore, we reverse 
In January of 1985, the defendants were each charged 
with two counts of wrongful use of a financial 
transaction card, a second degree felony [I Ml 
U C A , 1953, S 76-6-506 1 (ReplVol 8B, 1978, 
Supp 1985) The State alleged that the defendants 
Orig U S Govt Works 
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signed for purchases of $111 00 and $294 51 by using 
the American Express card of one Anne Bogarty 
Counsel for Steve Gomez filed a motion to reduce the 
charges to either a third degree felony under section 
76-6-506.2, or a class A misdemeanor under section 
76-6-506 5, on the grounds that sections 76-6-506 1 and 
-506 2 proscribe the same conduct and that a defendant 
has a right to be charged with the offense carrying the 
lesser penalty ITN21 The trial court agreed and 
suggested that the information be amended to charge 
the lesser offense The State, however, took the 
position that the proper remedy would be a dismissal by 
the trial court and refused to amend the information 
The trial court *749 then dismissed the information as 
to Steve Gomez Counsel for the State and for 
Jacqueline Gomez stipulated that she should be treated 
like her co-defendant, and the charges against 
Jacqueline were also dismissed The State appeals 
from the dismissal 
draft, money order, or any other similar 
document, or (5) Make application for a 
financial transaction card to an issuer, while 
knowingly making or causing to be made a 
false statement or report relative to his name 
occupation, financial condition, assets, or to 
willfully and substantially undervalue or 
understate any indebtedness for the purpose of 
influencing the issuer to issue the financial 
transaction card 
Section 76-6-506 5 states 
Any person found guilty of unlawful conduct 
described in sections 76-6- 506 2, 76-6-506 3, 
o r
 76-6-506 4 is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor If the retail value of the money, 
goods, or services obtained or attempted to be 
obtained through unlawful conduct described 
in sections 76-6-506 2 or 76-6-506 4 is $250 
or more, the person is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree 
FN1. Section 76-6-506 1 states 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, 
counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses, or 
encodes magnetically or electronically any 
financial transaction card, or who with intent 
to defraud, signs the name of another or a 
fictitious name to a financial transaction card, 
sales slip, sales draft, or any instrument for the 
payment of money which evidences a 
financial transaction card transaction, is guilty 
of a felony of the second degree 
FN2. Section 76-6-506 2 provides 
It is unlawful for any person to (1) 
Knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or 
attempt to obtain credit or purchase or attempt 
to purchase goods, property, or services, by 
the use of a false, fictitious, altered, 
counterfeit, revoked, expired, stolen, or 
fraudulently obtained financial transaction 
card, by any financial transaction card credit 
number, personal identification code, or by the 
use of a financial transaction card not 
authonzed by theissuer or the card holder, (2) 
Use a financial transaction card, with intent to 
defraud, to knowingly and willfully exceed the 
actual balance of a demand or time deposit 
account, (3) Use a financial transaction card, 
with intent to defraud, to willfully exceed an 
authonzed credit line by $500 or more, or by 
50% of such line, whichever is greater, (4) 
Willfully, with intent to defraud, deposit into 
his or any other account by means of an 
automated banking device, any false, 
fictitious, forged, altered, or counterfeit check, 
Before reaching the merits, we must first determine 
whether the State has the authority to appeal Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(c¥ 1) provides that "[a]n 
appeal may be taken by the prosecution (1) From a 
final judgment of dismissal" U C A , 1953, § 
77-35-26(c)(l) (Repl Vol 8C, 1982, Supp 1985) The 
defendants argue that the State moved for dismissal and 
now attempts to use that order of dismissal to obtain 
review of the trial court's decision to reduce the 
charges, a decision that would not otherwise be 
appealable as a matter of right The defendants assert 
that under our recent ruling m Stare v Waddoups Utah, 
712P.2d 223 (1985), the Court should not consider that 
claim 
We agree that the State has a nght to appeal only 
M[f]rom a final judgment of dismissal" However, the 
facts of this case are quite different from those in 
Waddoups In Waddoups, the trial court granted a 
defense motion to suppress the out-of-court statements 
of a witness The State chose not to proceed to trial, 
but instead moved to dismiss the information It then 
attempted to appeal the dismissal as a matter of right 
and to attack the suppression ruling However, the law 
is clear that the proper way to obtain review of a 
suppression ruling is to ask this Court to grant a 
discretionary interlocutory appeal U C A , 1953, § 
77-35-26(c)(5) (Repl Vol 8C, 1982, Supp 1985) We 
dismissed the appeal 
[11 In the present case, the trial court's determination 
that the charges should be reduced to an offense 
carrying a lesser penalty not charged m the onginal 
information prevented the State from proceeding on the 
original charges The effect of the trial court's ruling 
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was to block prosecution and, in effect, to dismiss the 
original charges Under these circumstances, the State 
properly suggested that the trial court formally dismiss 
the information and then appealed "[f]rom a final 
judgment of dismissal" These facts do not show an 
attempt by the State to skirt the restrictions of Rule 26 
appeals We therefore reach the merits 
The analytical framework for evaluating the 
defendants' claim is set out in State v Br\an Utah, 709 
P.2d 257, 263 (1985) 
[T]he criminal laws must be written so that there are 
significant differences between offenses and so that 
the exact same conduct is not subject to different 
penalties depending on which of two statutory 
sections a prosecutor chooses to charge To allow 
that would be to allow a form of arbitrariness that is 
foreign to our system of law 
Thus, in the present case, the question is whether the 
two statutes at issue proscribe exactly the same 
conduct, i e, do they contain the same elements7 See 
State v Shondel 22 Utah 2d 343, 346, 453 P 2d 146, 
148 (1969), State ^ Clark Utah, 632 P 2d 841, 844 
(1981), State \> Loveless, Utah, 581 P 2d 575, 576-77 
(1978), State v Smathers Utah, 602 P 2d 708, 710 
(1979), and State \ Bnan, 709 P 2d at 263-64 
[21[31 The State contends that the statutes at issue do 
not have identical elements because section 76-6-506 1 
requires proof of a "signing" of a sales slip, whereas 
section 76-6-506.2 does not, and section 76-6- 506 2 
requires proof of the value of items fraudulently 
purchased, while section 76-6-506 1 does not We 
agree Clearly, the legislature has determined that the 
act of fraudulently "signing" a card or sales slip should 
be punished more severely than the mere fraudulent use 
of a financial transaction card The legislature 
certainly has the power to make such a judgment See 
State v Twitchell 8 Utah 2d 314 333 P 2d 1075, 1078 
(1959) As we observed in State v Clark 
It is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more 
severe penalty for a particular type of cnme than the 
penalty which is imposed with respect to the general 
category of crimes to which the special *750 crime is 
related or of which it is a subcategory 
As long as the legislative classifications are not 
arbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a 
general and a specific provision of the criminal laws 
does not render the legislation unconstitutional, even 
though one violation is subject to a greater sentence 
632 P 2d at 843-44 It is true that the reason for the 
distinction between subsections -506 1 and -506 2 in 
the financial transaction card offenses is rather hard to 
fathom, especially when most credit card sales probably 
involve a "signing," but we cannot say it is irrational or 
arbitrary [TN3] 
FN3. Examples of transactions that do not 
involve a "signmg" include purchases by 
telephone or computer modem, use of a bank 
automated teller machine, or use of a credit 
card for identification 
[41 We noted in State v Clark that "when two statutes 
under consideration do not proscribe the same conduct 
[the] defendant may be charged with the crime 
carrying the more severe sentence " 632 P 2d at 844 
(citations omitted) The statutes at issue here are 
clearly distinguishable The record indicates that the 
defendants were charged with signing another's name to 
sales slips when they allegedly made purchases with the 
improperly obtained credit card Therefore, the State 
acted within its prosecutorial discretion when it charged 
Steve and Jacqueline Gomez with a second degree 
felony under the "signing" offense, section 76-6-506 1 
The trial court's ruling is reversed 
HALL, C J , and STEWART, HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ, concur 
722 P 2d 747 
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